Dynamic Travel Permits Allocation Mechanism for Decreasing Traffic Congestion and Drivers’ Dissatisfaction

  • Yuka Yamanari Advanced Institute of Industrial Technology
  • Takashi Nishino Advanced Institute of Industrial Technology
  • Hisashi Hayashi Advanced Institute of Industrial Technology
Keywords: Dynamic allocation, Multi-agent simulation, Rush hour traffic congestion, Travel Permits


An increasing number of people live in urban cities, and this trend is predicted to continue expo-nentially. However, such a tendency adversely influences infrastructure, such as roads, causing severe traffic congestion in some cities. In this paper, we present a new travel permit allocation mechanism to alleviate traffic congestion, especially during the rush hour of an urban area. This method aims to decrease drivers' dissatisfaction compared to existing odd-and-even license plate restrictions that mechanically assign the right of travel while maintaining the alleviated traffic congestion. To adequately allocate travel permits to each driver, we combined auction and per-sonal trading to respond to time-series changes in the participants' schedules. We evaluated the efficiency of the mechanism by multi-agent simulation from the two perspectives of traffic con-gestion and agent satisfaction score, which represents the degree of matching between the agents' schedules and their actual acquisition status of the travel permits. We experimented in two cases in which agents' departure points were uniformly distributed and unevenly distributed, and con-firmed that the proposed method improves the agent satisfaction score while limiting the number of vehicles to decrease traffic congestion.


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